![]() I also recommend turning on Temporary Access Pass, which is also found under your Authentication methods. This experience will use the number matching challenge by default, and it will also reduce password prompts in general. Be sure to save any changes you make on this screen.īack on the Enable and Target tab, you can optionally move to passwordless Authentication mode, where the authenticator app is the primary authentication method instead of the password. You can also choose to turn on Show the application name…, as well as the option to Show geographic location… These toggles will give the user more context about the sign-in attempt whenever an authenticator prompt occurs. On the Configure tab, you can move from Microsoft managed to Enabled. This setting will become the default experience on February 27 of 2023, but you can turn it on sooner if you like from Protect & secure > Authentication methods > Microso ft Authenticator in the Entra portal. This helps prevent what Microsoft calls “MFA fatigue,” or illegitimate authorizations due to automatic muscle memory. In other words, instead of just tapping “Approve” when the app notification comes up (which many people will do quickly by automatic reflex, or eventually after a flood of continuous prompts), they will be forced to identify the correct number which is being displayed to them. ![]() Microsoft recommends updating your policies for the Microsoft Authenticator app so that users are required to do number matching when logging into cloud resources. Update your authentication methods (number matching, etc.) In the following paragraphs, I will recommend some additional settings and policies to further cement your foundation and prevent some of the latest attack methods we have been seeing in the wild, with a bit of commentary explaining each. Once you have these basic scenarios covered, we have number of other holes to plug. I assume most of my readers already know about the Security Defaults, or these four equivalent CA policies: In the world of Azure AD and Microsoft 365, this means revisiting our Conditional Access (CA) policies and reconsidering our authentication methods. The tools to do the job are already available and waiting for you. Moving away from passwords and towards MFA or even passwordless authentication is still the right path, but you have to be willing to stay nimble and introduce additional iterative changes as we move forward in time. The good news is that having more than one proof of identity in place is still the foundation from which you must build. We also see a rise of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks where a user interacts with fake (but very convincing) login pages that include MFA prompts and everything.įirst, do not be discouraged: this process of “one-upmanship” is only natural. Thus, we have seen a steady rise during the pandemic years of more sophisticated phishing techniques, where users are tricked into giving up, approving, or passing time-bound access codes onto a third-party. ![]() ![]() The current state of affairs was inevitable of course: when we move our defenses up, the evildoers don’t just throw in the towel and go away, they simply adapt their methods. ![]() I think most of you reading this blog have probably even experienced or heard by now of an attack where MFA was enabled, but the bad guy got in anyway. I do not know what they would report today for a percentage of attacks which are thwarted by MFA alone, but I can tell you it wouldn’t be 99.9%. Do you remember just a short time ago, Microsoft would claim that switching on Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) prevents 99.9% of identity-based attacks? Well, the times they are a-changin. ![]()
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